Liberalization of utility sectors may bring the benefits of competition to customers, but it also creates risks of manipulation of the new system by powerful industrial actors. Litigation is one tool available to undermine or delay effective 
4 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author see a need for careful regulation. Those involved in regulating the newly competitive sectors correctly recognize that the greatest danger to successful liberalization is the previous state monopoly (the "incumbent"), both because of its size and power and because it has every incentive not to cooperate with the liberalization in normal circumstances. 4 Although in specific cases operators may have interests that would lead them to support the move to liberalization, 5 they are less likely to support the new obligations placed on them following liberalization: they will naturally want to maximize the advantages accruing to them from liberalizing while minimizing the restrictions placed on their use of their market power. STUDIES, 742, 745-747 (2001) . This willingness to support initial liberalization, however, does not undermine the point made here: the operators may have an interest in some liberalization, but they also have an interest in preserving their own market power as much as possible within the liberalized market. 6 VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT, Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment, 9 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL 'Y, 894, 908 (2002) ; Thatcher 2004, supra note 5.
5 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author treaties on ensuring free movement of goods and services and preventing protectionism of large national firms against competition. 7 However, the incumbent operator is not the only powerful economic actor in European member states. Some of the new entrants are also powerful corporations. The natural image of new entrant in communications for many laypeople is the small communications start up, which can be described in contrast to the huge, impersonal multi nationals or huge incumbents that initially dominate the market. There are certainly companies like that.
8 But many of the operators entering European communications market are "new entrants" to a specific country, but as describe in part 1.b, in no other way resemble a small start up. These sophisticated, powerful economic actors naturally want to maximize the benefits from liberalization. One avenue for them is to use the European Institutions to promote the aspects of liberalization they prefer -for example, access to the incumbent network -and at the same time use them to avoid the counterweights put in place to prevent harm from liberalization and avoid obligations put in place to protect valuable interests. That is not to say that these actors do not need protection against the incumbent, with its inherent advantages, just to caution that they should not be automatically seen as the "under dog", a David needing help against a Goliath. That is not a criticism of these new entrants; part of the philosophy behind liberalization is that the entry of new competitors would bring to the sector the benefits of free market competition. Sophisticated competitors, out to maximize their benefits, can 6 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author probably balance the weight of the incumbent better than only small new companies, and thus contribute to competition. But the designers of the system and its regulators need to be aware that this is a battle of giants, and design the system to prevent abuses from either side. This paper demonstrates that this concern is not only theoretical, by telling the story of how French operators attempted to avoid their universal service obligations through European and then French litigation. In 2001, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the French system of funding universal service in telecommunications to be in violation of EU law.
9 Subsequent funding decisions were repeatedly attacked by operators in the French administrative courts, especially the Conseil d'État, for a number of reasons.
The decision and its aftermath can be seen-as the ECJ clearly saw it-as another attempt by France to put obstacles in the path of new entrants. Under this view, France does not share the ideology of free competition and unregulated markets and is anxious to protect its national champion, France Télécom, from competition through all means fair or foul. However, the battle around funding universal service can also be seen in another light-as a carefully thought out attack by sophisticated competitors on a regulatory scheme protecting a value they had no wish to pay for, universal service. A similar strategy-litigating to fight regulation-was adopted in the United States by industry actors unhappy with regulation aimed at them or burdens put on them. 10 This paper 7 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author suggests that that approach better fits existing data, and will be useful for understanding the behavior of the operators after the ECJ decision, when they brought repeated cases against universal service decisions by the French regulator.
Three general lessons emerge from this different reading of the battle around French Universal Service Funding. First, it supports the warning mentioned above, that the incumbent may not be the only actor with an incentive to combat or subvert the postliberalization regulatory framework, and that regulators and courts should be wary of abuses of the system by new entrants too. Second, there is a real tension between the need to provide private actors a forum in which to defend themselves against excessive regulation and to protect their rights and the need to prevent use of the court system to cause delays and torpedo regulation. Ways to resolve that tension need to be considered.
Finally, France's universal service experience emphasizes the importance of designing regulatory systems to prevent potential problems (or create procedural safeguards in the right places)-an issue considered in other contexts.
11 . In this specific context, the 8 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author finance aspects of public service operators may not share. Operators are more apt to act strategically to block a large annual assessment than they are to object to the addition of a small monthly charge to customers' bills.
Part I describes the French market post liberalization, and the framework put in place by France to fund universal service. Part II describes the version of the story reflected in the ECJ decision. Part III suggests the alternative version and describes the data supporting it. Part IV discusses the implications of the story. I then conclude with some general observations.
Part I: Funding Universal Service in France

I.a: The Framework for Funding Universal Service
European Union law required all member states to open their telecommunications market to competition as of 1998. From then on, the invisible hand of the market should rule the sector, rather than the former state monopolies. 12 However, alongside the impetus for reform, concerns were raised about the effect such reform might have on values important to the people of the member states, such as universal service. 13 Universal service in this context refers to providing access to telecommunications in ways a "pure" free market would not (and see below for the details of the French concept). 2004) . 27 The regulator of telecommunications in France used to be l' Autorité de régulation des télécommunications, known as the ART; however, following the regulatory package of 2003 the agency became the Autorité de régulation des communications electroniques et des postes, known as ARCEP. I am referring generally to ART since at the time of the events surrounding the EU decision, it was the ART, and I think that consistency in using the name will prevent confusion.
12 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author calculation. However, beyond the problem of calculating the cost, important questions about distributing the burden remain. Which operators will contribute? How will their share be calculated? There are several ways to do this, and any choice would be controversial, since there will inevitably be winners and losers.
Under the European directive, Universal Service costs are determined by calculating the costs of providing it minus the costs that the operator would incur anyway, i.e., comparing the costs to the operator in a situation where they have to provide universal service with a hypothetical situation in which they would not have to provide it.
However, that still leaves a lot to be determined. The costs assessed for universal service in France can be grouped under five headings:
1. Rebalancing France Télécom's tariffs until 2000, as a temporary measure.
2. The costs of geographic balancing-i.e., assuring that all customers, regardless of where they live, pay the same maximum price for fixed access and fixed voice telecommunications service, so that rural customers and customers living in remote locations (where the costs of providing services are higher) will not pay substantially higher sums than those in urban areas.
3. Social tariffs-special low tariffs for "vulnerable customers," who cannot afford full price.
4. The costs of providing public payphones even where it is not profitable.
5. The costs of publishing an annual free paper directory and running a vocal directory service at a reasonable price.
While the calculation of the costs for items 2 through 5 was done in a fairly straightforward (although quite lengthy) way using measured data, for item 1 France used 13 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author a very complicated formula which required both estimated and measured data. France Télécom collected the measurable data with some accuracy, but the basis for the estimation was challenged successfully by the European Commission before the ECJ.
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The calculation of all five components is complex, lengthy and requires masses of data, supplied annually by the universal service supplier, France Télécom (most of the data is subject to audits annually conducted by the regulator, ART). The entire process is work intensive and requires a high level of expertise.
France initially decided to include all licensed operators, including mobile operators, but not Internet Service Providers (ISPs), as contributors. The requirement that mobile operators share in paying for the costs for 1997 only was struck down by the ECJ's decision, but those operators were not absolved from contributing the costs of universal service in subsequent years. France calculated the burden on each operator according to the volume (in terms of minutes) of use of the network; it later decided to charge each operator by revenue, seeing revenue as a more equitable measure. France Télécom was also a contributor, and in fact paid the major share (under either system).
In addition, during the first few years, France used several transitional arrangements. For example, instead of calculating some of the components of the formula for the first two years, where the numbers were not being collected yet, it used flat rate estimates based on numbers used by other European countries.
I.b: Who is required to pay Universal Service?
29 28 The rebalancing tariff, the first component, is calculated using the following formula: C = 12 x (Pe -P) x N where Pe is the estimated monthly subscription charge after rebalancing; P is the actual subscription charge at the time and N is the number of customers without special contracts. This information is taken from the ECJ decision, Case C-146/00 As explained above, the costs of universal service are mostly spread between France's fixed and mobile operators. Who are these operators?
The main provider of universal service is the French incumbent, France Télécom, currently only partly owned by government (45.3%), but strongly influenced by it in more than one way. The head of the firm was usually a figure with substantial political connections (a former president of France Télécom, Thierry Breton, had then become the Minister for industrial affairs and is known to be a friend of Rafarrin, the former Prime Minister 30 , and his successors -both the chairman of the board and the CEO -are also well connected 31 ). In addition, many agency members have worked, in the past, for France Télécoms, as have many members of other companies or of other actors who work in the telecommunications field. However, France Télécom did not just receive funding for universal service, it also paid into the fund, both as "France Télécom" and for its mobile operator, Orange, and since it was -by any criteria -still the largest operator, it paid the largest share. This was described to me, by a member of France Télécom, as "we take the money out of our right pocket to pay into our left pocket". 32 pp. 101-107 describing the French market. The dissertation is on file with author (I'll be happy to email a copy to the editorial board). Some of the information was updated; in those cases the references are clearly noted. 30 In the words of one Frenchman in an informal conversation, 'ils se tutoient', or they address each other using the familiar 'tu' address. 31 From the biography of Didier Lombard, appointed CEO and then chairman of the board of directors of France Télécom after Breton: From 1988 to 1990 17 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author the costs of universal service, thereby benefiting France Télécom at the expense of new entrants. For example, ECJ criticized France's inclusion of "red list" costs-the list of customers whose name will not appear in the directory, non-listed customers-as part of the calculation. Conversely, France did not calculate the "intangible benefits" that France Télécom will receive from being the universal service provider.
43 France was also charged with "estimating up" in several cases-i.e., evaluating costs beyond what was the rate in other countries. Second, the commission strongly criticized several methodological "shortcuts" used by France to calculate the costs of the first years. France chose not to calculate some of the components in its formula, instead using estimates based on the practices in other countries as shortcuts. For example, it set the net cost of non-profitable subscribers at 1% of total turnover; and the geographical component at 3% of turnover. It also calculated the initial cost of a non-profitable household as if all households were non-profitable, claiming it is unable to identify those that were profitable before the balancing of the tariffs. The claim against the method was that the Finding against the French system, the ECJ, under this version of the story, bravely forced the rogue state to correct its problematic practices. Indeed, ART's reevaluation after the ECJ's decision showed substantial reductions in the assessed amount of costs of universal service and the amount operators had to pay to the fund. The amount for 1998 went down from 4,374 million francs before the ECJ's decision to 1,806 million francs after it; the amounts for 1999 went down from 1,646 million francs before to 725 million francs after the decision. 44 However, even with the ECJ's brave interference, the French system was not completely fixed, and constant vigilance was required. Luckily, the operators competing with France Télécom took the burden on themselves. Accordingly, when the French regulator continued to be recalcitrant, the association of French operators-AFORSTfiled another complaint with the commission. 45 Similarly, operators brought several suits in the French courts against France, demanding that the system be corrected. 20 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author its own. If France Télécom is to operate as any other firm competing in the market, forcing it to fund alone the non-profitable services government thinks should be provided puts it at a disadvantage compared to its competitors. Rather, costs should be shared in a way that puts all market players in the same situation, as part of the cost of doing business in France. Accordingly, the mechanism required other operators to contribute to a universal service fund that will cover the costs. ART will calculate the costs according to criteria detailed by the legislature. They will be apportioned among operators according to an objective formula based on the advantages they get from the system. While France Télécom, the monopoly that receives the highest advantages, will bear the bulk of the costs, other operators will bear a proportion of the costs according to their profits. France designed the system according to its best understanding of what was allowed under European Union law, although it did place a value on compensating France Télécom for real costs it incurs in providing what is, in effect, a social service.
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The competing operators are for-profit companies that do not share the French government's commitment to universal service. Even if they may be sympathetic to universal service in principle, they naturally want to minimize their share, or not pay it.
Faced with large annual bills for universal service, they have a strong incentive to mobilize and fight to undermine the funding system. Initially, they took the fight to Europe. After the ECJ had its say and the French regulator fixed the system accordingly, they had to find a different way to avoid the costs. They started challenging every At this point the operators started combating the requirement that they share in paying the cost for universal service using the domestic courts. In the years following the ECJ decision many cases were brought against the regulator. Some had merit. But many were brought without any attempt to appeal to the minister, ignoring a basic procedural requirement embedded in the French Code of Administrative Justice.
The first case decided was brought by the company Tiscali, objecting to the assessment of over three million Euros for its universal service contribution in 2002.
Tiscali emphasized its financial difficulties and the fact that the law was not yet changed in accordance with the ECJ's decision.
The court made two important rulings. 53 As a general matter it stated that funding universal service was an important policy objective for which the minister was responsible. Since the matter could be urgent, the minister had, in principle, the right to enact temporary decrees setting amounts to be paid even before the law was changed in accordance with the ECJ decision. However, the court ruled that such decisions must be made in a transparent way. The arrêt in this case was not published, nor were the 52 The French system, where the executive enjoys substantial powers to legislate as well as to create rules, has more than one kind of rule/regulation. An arrêt is a relatively low-level -i.e., specific, and subject to other types of regulations -implementation decree. 23 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author operators notified about it before receiving their apportionment-therefore it was void.
While the court acknowledged that the operator had a case in this instance, it made it clear that the operator's main contention, that no costs can be placed on operators until a new decree 54 is passed, was wrong. The Minister and ART can require Operators to contribute to the universal service fund before the law is amended according to the ECJ decision, as long as the process is transparent and the ruling observed.
The Tiscali case was the opening shot, followed by many other cases. The demands (requests) mentioned in the second paragraph of the previous article 60 must be preceded by an appeal (reclamation) to the actor esablishing the tax ».
61
In other words, the law clearly requires an application to the minister against the assessment made against the operator. In spite of this clear requirements, the cases were filed without any attempt by the companies to address their concerns to the regulator or minister before hand. As described above, the companies are sophisticated large actor, including French branches of other European incumbents, such as Teleitalia, the Italian incumbent, and telecommunications companies belonging to large, sophisticated French business conglomerates, such as Bouygues Telecoms and SFR. They are well acquainted with French law, or at least, can hire lawyers who are. It is unlikely the lawyers missed the non-exhaustion requirement described above.
The impression is of cases being brought to the Conseil d'État even if operators know the case will be rejected. The question is, why.
One explanation is that the operators, rightly or wrongly, expect the minister to automatically side with the regulator, and do not want to waste time on a futile appeal. 58 The principle that before taking an administrative agency to court an actor must exhaust -make use ofthe procedures to challenge the decision offered by the agency is a long standing one in American administrative law. See add cases and articles. 59 Code de Justice Administrative, R. 772-2. The text was copied from www.legifrance.com, the French Government's legislative portal. 60 Demands related to taxes and other impositions that fall under the administrative jurisdiction. See Code de Justice Administrative, R. 772-1. 61 Second paragraph of the article dropped. The translation is my own.
25 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author This may be true, but they must know that not approaching the minister will harm their chances at appeal. Another explanation is needed.
In a system where decisions need to be made every year and where the decisions require a high level of expertise and intensive labor, recurring appeals can be very disruptive. The Conseil d'État did not overrule any of the cases on substantive grounds; but it annulled several of the decisions that were made before the passage of the 2003 decree on procedural grounds. And it did so in decisions that came down in 2005, after the decree was in place. That means the companies could hope to delay the process and/or recoup some of the costs. The courts could be used to delay and weaken the implementation of the universal service funding mechanism.
Part IV: Discussion
The first question is which version of the story is more convincing. The first story fits views of the French economy as based on support of national champions and opposition to the liberalization process.
62 It can fit with previous tensions between
France and the European Commission on liberalization. And it is supported by the dramatic decrease in costs of universal service charged to the operators compared to the costs before the ECJ decision.
However, the second version seems more convincing.
The realities of universal service are such that the benefits to France Télécom from increasing the funding are not very great. France Télécom pays the largest share of universal service costs. The legal framework allows other operators to provide certain 26 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author parts of the universal service too. In particular, companies can offer social tariffsreduced tariffs to individual groups-and be reimbursed for their loss from the universal service funds. At least one company took advantage of that option, for a time. 63 Therefore, increasing universal service funding is not a dramatic help for France Télécom. The French government's interest in inflating them to support the incumbent is not as great as it might appear at first blush.
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But the more important evidence supporting the second story are 65 the continuing and recurrent appeals to the courts. The heavy use of the domestic courts after the ECJ decision-especially bringing cases doomed to failure-suggests reluctance to pay the contribution whatever the amount. Even winning regularly, the need to constantly defend its behavior in court adds to the agency's burden and may lead it to be very cautious in its decision-making.
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Judicial review of administrative agencies seeks to prevent abuses and offer a counter to agency professional biases. 67 However, as acknowledged by scholars, judicial review carries its own risks. 68 One of those risks, though not the only one, is the ability of Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author regulatees to use courts to delay and undermine regulation they are unhappy with. The idea that courts can be used to delay implementation of regulation is not new. 69 However, dealing with the problem presents a constant challenge, and few real solutions have been suggested. The problem is that the companies involved have a legitimate interest to defend. They need a way to protect their rights and prevent abuses by the regulators, as well as solve disputes with them-and the courts are an acknowledged mechanism to handle these kinds of issues. 70 In the French case especially, companies had good reasons to worry about the regulator being subservient to France Télécom, since there were close ties between many members of the regulators and France Télécom-specifically, many members of the regulator were trained in the École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications (now Telecom Paris Tech), previously funded by France Télécom, or worked for the company before being members of the regulator. 71 Therefore, a mechanism for defending their rights is justifiably important to these companies.
On the other hand, the companies also have good reasons not to accept the system of funding universal service. From the point of view of the new entrants, avoiding costs they do not have to bear is part of their "job"-they are corporations judged by the amount of money they make for their shareholders, and fighting to establish themselves in a new market. Even if they agree with the idea of universal service in principle, there is 28 of 43 Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author no reason for them to want to pay for it if they can avoid or minimize costs-a classic free rider situation. And as sophisticated strategic actors they know how to use to their advantage all the mechanisms in place, including the courts.
The problem, then, is how to balance the new entrants' legitimate interest in protecting their rights while minimizing their ability to abuse the system.
One alternative is to use judicial review doctrines to balance those interests.
Especially in the case of the Conseil d'État. The Conseillers d'État have been trained as civil servants and specialize in handling administrative cases. Furthermore, some members of the Conseil fill important roles in the public service. 72 They can be trusted to understand the realities of administration and create appropriate doctrines.
The problem with this solution is not the inability of the Conseil d'État to handle the cases before it, but the way the court is used in this area. It is litigation itself, not how cases are decided, that diverts resources to handling cases, and has the potential to cause delay and uncertainty. 73 Another solution is to impose substantial costs. Access to the Conseil d'État is in fact limited by the risk of the loser having to pay costs, including lawyers' fees. 74 In some of the cases below, though not in many, costs have already been awarded to the government; however, those costs were clearly not enough to deter -they are not very high. One way to reduce problematic lawsuits is for the Conseil d'État to use its powers to award higher levels of costs-"punitive" costs-where appropriate. The concern is that such a power may deter suits that should be brought-i.e., have too much of a chilling Draft: Do not quote or cite without permission from author effect. The judges' expertise may justify entrusting them with such power. On the other hand, since the Conseil d'État does have very close ties to the administration, on the face of it concerns may be raised about it using that power to protect the government.
However, the Conseil d'État enjoys a high level of respect and is seen as independent, certainly not as being hand in glove with the government, 75 it can safely use its powers to impose costs without much risk of provoking undue criticism.
Yet another possible way around the problem is to design the regulatory system to reduce incentives to use the courts as a delay tactic. 
